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COMMENTS
HOISTED BY THEIR OWN PETARD:i
ADVERSE INFERENCES IN CIVIL
FORFEITURE
I. INTRODUCrION
Civil forfeiture laws2 are an important weapon in the govern-
ment's arsenal against drugs.3 By attacking the economic base of drug
traffickers through civil forfeiture proceedings and seizing "drug fi-
nanced" property, the government hopes to cripple drug trafficking
in the United States.4 The government's war on drugs is bolstered by
I WIuLiAM SHAxEsPEARE, HAMLET act 3, Sc. 4. Hamlet says, referring to Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern: "For tis the sport to have the engineer/Hoist with his own petar ....
Hamlet has switched the letters they carried to the King of England for letters asking the
King to kill them. See also Arthur W. Leach & John W. Malcolm, Ciminal Forfiture: An
Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. Ray. 241 (1994) (using the
phrase "hoisted by their own petard" to refer to the effect of forfeiture on narcotics
traffickers). Today, this phrase commonly means "destroyed by his own trickery or
inventiveness." DICTIONARY OF WORD & PHRASE ORIGIN 290 (William & Mary Morris eds.,
1988).
2 This Comment will discuss only the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Other civil forfeiture proceedings may have the same constitutional
problems; however, a discussion of each of them would be outside the scope of this
Comment.
3 See Christine M. Durkin, Note, CivilForfeiture UnderFederal Narcotics Law: The Impact of
the Shfting Burden of Proof upon the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. Ray. 679, 679-80 nn.14 (1990) (citing Charles Edward Anderson, Unce Sam
Gets Serious: A Report from theFront Line, 76 A.BAJ. 60, 60-61 (Feb. 1990) (during the 1980s
the number of narcotics cases rose 270% although the war on drugs was not officially
declared until 1989)). The Reagan administration initiated the current aggressive use of
forfeiture laws to combat both the use of drugs as well as drug trafficking through the "zero
tolerance policy." Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1990). Prior to the Reagan administration, forfeiture laws were
used primarily against drug traffickers. Id. See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974) (discussing the importance of forfeiture as a method of
combatting narcotics trafficking).
4 U.S. DEPARTMENT oFJusTiEs, CRIMINAL DIVISION, AsSET FonrEITR OFFICE, FOR=-
URS VOLUME I: INTRODUCTION TO CrVIL STATUTES V (1984) (stating that today "forfeiture
has become one of the primary law enforcement tools" because it is a "powerful" weapon
against crime). See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663 (yacht forfeited because of the discovery
of one marijuana cigarette); United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe Auto, 364 F. Supp.
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civil forfeiture proceeds which are used to finance the government's
law enforcement efforts.5 In a discussion about seized proceeds, for-
mer Attorney General Richard Thornburgh stated: "It's satisfying to
think that it's now possible for a drug dealer to serve time in a forfei-
ture-financed prison after being arrested by agents driving a forfei-
ture-provided automobile while working in a forfeiture-funded sting
operation."'6 While this concept may appeal to our sense ofjustice, it
may compromise constitutional principles.
Since forfeiture proceedings are civil actions, many of the consti-
tutional protections of criminal proceedings do not apply. For exam-
ple, claimants do not have the full Fifth Amendment "right to
silence." If a claimant chooses to "take the Fifth" in civil proceedings,
a court may draw an adverse inference from her silence.
7
This Comment will evaluate the constitutional implications of
drawing such negative inferences from a claimant's decision to invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege in forfeiture actions under the Drug
Abuse and Prevention Act.8 First, this Comment will explore the his-
torical background of forfeiture and discuss the Fifth Amendment
and any implications that the amendment's historical development
might have on its use in forfeiture proceedings. Then, this Comment
will analyze the Supreme Court's holdings with regard to the use of
the Fifth Amendment in forfeiture actions and will analyze its more
recent holdings that arguably broaden the constitutional protections
for claimants in forfeiture proceedings. A discussion of the constitu-
tional implications of drawing a negative inference from a claimant's
silence will conclude this Comment.
II. A CML CLAIMANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Civil claimants do not always receive the same constitutional
745 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Porsche forfeited when its occupant bought a small quantity of
heroin).
5 21 U.S.C. § 881 (e) (1988). See also Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 251 nn.37-38
(showing that the Department of Justice has committed millions of dollars of forfeited
funds to the federal prison system).
6 Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 251 nn.37-38 (citing Seized Drug Funds to Pay for
Prisons, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1989, at A10). Thornburgh announced that $229 million
from forfeited funds would be used to build prison cells. Id.
7 See, e.g., United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625 (1lth Cir. 1986) (finding
that a negative inference may be taken from a claimant's silence in a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding as long as the court's final judgment is not based solely on that inference). But see
United States v. Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that negative inferences may be impermissible in the forfeiture context "given the
severity of the deprivation at risk").
8 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)-(k) (1988).
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rights awarded criminal defendants. 9 This is problematic in civil for-
feiture proceedings because often the government simultaneously in-
stitutes both criminal and civil actions against a suspected drug
trafficker' ° and evidence in a civil action may be used in a criminal
action." Basically, the civil claimant unwillingly may provide the gov-
ernment with the information that may convict her.' 2
One reason forfeiture proceedings operate in the civil arena is
because of the "guilty property" fiction.' 3 In civil forfeiture actions,
the property is the defendant, not its owner.' 4 Property has no consti-
tutional rights; therefore, owners have not always received full consti-
9 The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not apply in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 n.4 (1998), nor does the Due
Process requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The state may take an inno-
cent owner's property that has been an instrumentality of a crime under a remedial equita-
ble state statute without violating the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause. SeeBennis
v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269, at *6-7 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996). The Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply to civil forfeiture cases that may be characterized as remedial. Austin, 113 S.
Ct. at 2804 n.4. But see United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 1994 WL
528447 (9th Cir.). In Piper Cherokeejuries found against claimant in both civil and criminal
proceedings. Id. Later, when the claimant's criminal conviction was reversed, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the civil forfeiture of the aircraft, finding that the forfei-
ture was premised on the same facts as the criminal charges and therefore fell under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
Sometimes a civil claimant may have the right to a jury trial. The government may
bring a forfeiture proceeding through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental
Rules of Admiralty Rule C, per 21 U.S.C. § 881 (b), or through other statutory avenues
pursuant to § 881(d). While claimants in a common law court may request a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment, parties in an admiralty suit are specifically denied the
right to a jury trial. FED. R. Cw. PROC. 38(e). See also Schecter, supra note 3, at 1167
(discussing the injustice of the denial of ajury trial in admiralty suits). The Seventh Circuit
has recently held that it will grant ajury trial to property seized on land under admiralty
rules. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) (holding that the govern-
ment may bring both proceedings except when "the Government has brought a civil action
solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the defendant
in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution"). See also United
States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845, 851 (6th Cir. 1994).
11 Lodon v. Patterson, 463 F.2d 95, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906
(1973) (holding that a deposition voluntarily given in a civil action was admissible in a
subsequent criminal action when the defendant knew of his Fifth Amendment privilege
and that there were possible criminal charges).
12 Parties who voluntarily testify in a civil proceeding waive their privilege and are
therefore bound to answer any questions during their cross-examination that were made
relevant by their direct examination. Brown v. United States, 856 U.S. 148 (1958). Addi-
tionaly, prosecutors may use civil discovery to obtain information about other drug crimes
that may be related to the property. See, e.g., United States v. Michelle's Lounge 39 F.3d
684, 701 (7th Cir. 1994). Both parties may abuse discovery by using information obtained
in one proceeding in another. Id.
13 See generally Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974)
(detailing the history of the guilty property fiction).
14 See discussion infra part lIlA-B.
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tutional protection, such as the Fifth Amendment right to due
process, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, or the Eighth
Amendment right against excessive punishment. 15 Since the owner's
guilt or innocence is not at issue, sometimes a guiltless owner will lose
her property.16
The government has attempted to address this problem by in-
cluding "innocent owner" provisions in some forfeiture statutes.1 7
These provisions require the owner to prove that she did not consent
nor did she know that her property was going to be used in associa-
tion with any drug transactions.18 This burden is often hard to meet;
consequently, it does not protect many owners. For example, the in-
nocent owner provision has not applied to parents who let their child
borrow their car, knowing that their child had used drugs in the past
or had associated with people who use drugs.' 9
Although the Supreme Court recently reexamined civil forfeiture
laws and ensured claimants their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights
and the protection of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause,20 important constitutional rights still remain undefined in the
civil forfeiture context.2 1 An individual's Fifth Amendment right not
15 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Claimant's now have some of these rights.
See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (Eighth Amendment's excessive fines
clause applies in civil forfeiture actions); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop-
erty, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause
requires notice and a preseizure hearing before the government seizes real property).
16 See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (upholding the for-
feiture of an automobile co-owned by a husband and wife without any compensation to the
innocent wife when the automobile was forfeited to the state upon the husband's convic-
tion of gross indecency with a prostitute inside the automobile); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at
690 (upholding the forfeiture of a yacht although it was the lessees of the yacht that
brought marijuana aboard her).
17 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a)(6)-(7) (1988). Recently, the Supreme Court noted
that the inclusion of an innocent owner defense in this statute indicates that the purpose
of the statute is to punish. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810; but see Bennis, 1996 WL 88269, *6-7 (In
an opinion that was not joined by a majority of the court Justice Rehnquist noted that a
state remedial civil forfeiture statute was both punitive, deterrent, and remedial.). Com-
mentators have argued that the "innocent owner" provisions do not sufficiently ameliorate
the harshness of forfeiture laws. See, e.g., Schecter, supra note 3, at 1180.
18 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a)(6)-(7) (1988).
19 United States v. One 1978 Chrysler Le Baron Station Wagon, 648 F. Supp. 1048, 1051
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that parents who knew that their child had a minor criminal
record did not take reasonable care when they let him drive their car).
20 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). But see Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269
(U.S. Mar. 4, 1996).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1988)
(civil forfeiture statutes do not afford the full spectrum of constitutional protections);
United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1987) ("It is true that
forfeiture statutes like Section 881 have been considered criminal for certain purposes ....
However, for other purposes, the civil nature of forfeiture procedures has been held to bar
[Vol. 86
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to incriminate herself lingers in this nebulous arena.2 2 Can one infer
"guilt" when a claimant exercises her Fifth Amendment privilege not
to incriminate herself in a civil forfeiture proceeding?
In Baxter v. Palmigianos a prison disciplinary board was permitted
to infer guilt from a prisoner's silence in the face of charges against
him.2 4 The Supreme Court held that in prison administrative discipli-
nary proceedings "an adverse inference in a quasi-criminal action
from assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege does not impermissi-
bly burden a claimant's constitutional rights."25 The circuit courts
have disagreed in their interpretations of the Baxter holding as applied




Historically, statutory in rem forfeiture has been considered a
form of punishment.2 7 However, commentators have disagreed about
its origins and the purpose of the "sanctions" it imposes. In The Com-
mon Law, Oliver Wendall Holmes argues that contemporary forfeiture
statutes arose primarily as a legal justification for the "deodand,"28 an
object that caused the death of another 29 and was forfeited to the
the application of important constitutional protections.") (citation omitted), cert. denied
108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
22 The Fifth Amendment in the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
23 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
24 Id. at 317-18.
25 Id.
26 See United States v. Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 108 (2d
Cir. 1990) (stating that negative inferences may be impermissible in the forfeiture context
"given the severity of the deprivation at risk"); United States v. A Single Family Residence,
803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a negative inference may be taken from a
claimant's silence in a civil forfeiture proceeding as long as the court's final judgment is
not based solely on the inference); United States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980) (holding that a negative inference may not be
taken from a claimant claiming her Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent because
claimants have the same safeguards as criminal defendants).
27 Austin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993).
28 Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, "to be given to God." See Calero-To-
ledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 668, 681 n.16 (1974). Holmes traces the devel-
opment of the deodand to Exodus 28:21: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die:
then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox
shall be quit." OLVER W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 31 (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed., 1963).
But seeJacobJ. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignt, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (arguing that deo-
dands and forfeiture laws developed independently).
29 See HoLMEs, supra note 28, at 10, 31.
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Crown.30 The deodand was tainted by the death it had caused,31 so
with its value, the Crown purportedly paid the church to say masses
for the dead person's soul.3 2 Holmes argues that the deodand was a
substitute for revenge.33 Since the owner of the object did not suffer
any liability other than forfeiture of her property, all guilt for the act
was held by the object, not the perpetrator.3
4
In contrast, Blackstone believed that the deodand had deeper sig-
nificance than a family's need for revenge. He argued that ultimately
the only valid foundation for forfeiture lies in the substance of the
contract that individuals make when forming a community.35 If an
individual transgresses the law of a society, she breaks the social con-
tract.3 6 Consequently, she forfeits to the state any rights or privileges
derived from that social contract.
3 7
30 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 290 (Ist ed. 1765,
1979); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
31 Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of the Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has
Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MiAMi L. REv. 911, 929 (1991) (quotingJay A- Rosenberg,
Comment, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 390, 391
(1988)).
32 See id. See also United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387-89 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (tracing the development of the deodand).
33 HOLMES, supra note 28, at 31. Common law mandated forfeiture for felonies and
treason. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 299. Those that breached the king's peace through
criminal acts lost the privilege of owning property. Id. Additionally, objects used in viola-
tion of English customs and revenue laws were statutorily forfeited. Id. at 261-62. Usually,
these forfeitures were enforced in the Court of Exchequer in the same in rem procedures
used to seize the property of felons. Id. A problem with this theory is that objects often
caused the death-objects that may have even belonged to the victim. See Finkelstein,
supra note 28, at 182.
34 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 261-62. However, Blackstone notes that forfeiture of
chattels was also grounded, in part, on the negligence of the owner. Id. at 290-91. If an
individual were killed by a moving object, the owner probably could have avoided the
accident; failure to avoid the accident constituted negligence. Id. From this perspective,
loss of the object was essentially a punishment. Id. Support for Blackstone's argument may
be found in the elimination of the deodand in England during the same year (1846) as the
passage of the first statute, "Act For Compensating Families of Persons Killed By Accidents"
(also known as "Lord Cambell's Act"), creating a private cause of action for wrongful
death. See Finkelstein, supra note 28, at 170-73 & nn.1-16.
35 Blackstone states:
The true reason and only substantial ground for any forfeiture of crimes consist in
this; that all property is derived from society, being one of those civil rights which are
conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom which
every man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities. If therefore a mem-
ber of any national community violates the fundamental contract of his association, by
transgressing the municipal law, he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by
that contract; and the state may veryjustly resume that portion of property, or any part
of it, which the laws have before assigned him.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 289.
36 Id.
37 Id. Some commentators disagree with Blackstone, arguing that the deodand shifted
the focus from an owner, and the justification for punishing her, to the object. See Piety,
[Vol. 86
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Recent commentators, agreeing in part with Blackstone, contend
that early English forfeitures were imposed on individuals for the ben-
efit of the community; an owner's guilt or innocence was moot s be-
cause the good of the community transcended the needs of the
individual.3 9 Therefore, forfeiture was not about liability, but evolved
as a means to compensate the King and society for the loss of one of
its components.40 Whatever one's views of its derivations, deodands
were a valuable source of revenue for the Crown and continued in
England until the mid-nineteenth century when they were abolished
by statute.4
1
Modern forfeiture acts originated during England's seventeenth
century maritime expansion.42 Forfeiture proceedings arose in admi-
ralty as a response to the needs of the merchant class.43 Through for-
feiture, the government could proceed in an in rem action against the
property.44
Although deodands never became part of the common law in
supra note 31, at 931.
38 HOLMES, supra note 28, at 23. See also Michael D. Dantrick, Note, The "Innocent
Owner" Defense in Civil Drug Forfeiture After United States v. 92 Buena Vrsta Avenue: Still an
Uphill Battle for Third Party Claimants, 1994 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 995, 999 (Dantrick quotes a
medieval English author who described forfeiture as "[W] here a man kylleth a nother with
the sworde of J[ohn] at [S]tyle the sworde shal[l] be forfet as deodande [and] yet no
defaulte [was] in the owner.").
39 Finkelstein, supra note 28, at 250. The deodand was only used in wrongful death
cases. Moreover, the death causing instrument was forfeited even if it had belonged to the
victim. Id. at 182; James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Laz--Banished at
Last; 62 CoRmNu. L. REv. 768, 772 n.31 (1977).
40 Finkelstein, supra note 28, at 183 (arguing that the real rationale for the deodand
institution lay in the assumption by the state-in England, i.e., the Crown-"of the role of
the vicar of transcendent concerns and values, superseding the Church in most of its au-
thority in these domains"); see also Piety, supra note 31, at 931-32.
41 In 1846 Parliament abolished the law of deodands when it passed An Act to Abolish
Deodands, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 62 (Eng.). However, at the same time, Parliament passed
Lord Campbell's Act, which created a private cause of action for wrongful death. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
42 Schecter, supra note 3, at 1154. Admiralty in rem actions came from the mid-seven-
teenth century English Navigation Acts, which were enacted to compensate for the inability
of the admiralty courts to assert in personamjurisdiction. Piety, supra note 31, at 935-36.
Merchants liked the in rem proceeding because it gave them a significantly greater chance
at compensation than would a similar suit at common law. Schecter, supra note 3, at 1154.
Governments liked it because it allowed the forfeiture of ships as a penalty when owners
attempted to avoid paying customs duties. Piety, supra note 31, at 935-36. See also Calera-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (12
Wheat.) (1827).
43 See Schecter, supra note 3, at 1154. Because ships were often owned by more than
one person, at common law a merchant would have to bring separate in personam suits
against each of the owners, who sometimes numbered 30 or more. Id. n.27. See also Piety,
supra note 31, at 935-36.
44 See Schecter, supra note 3, at 1154; Piety, supra note 31, at 935-36.
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America, 45 forfeiture laws did cross the Atlantic. Forfeiture for stolen
goods or goods in violation of the revenue laws was authorized first by
English statutes and then, after the establishment of the United States
government, by American revenue acts.46 During the American Revo-
lutionary War and the Civil War, forfeiture statutes were an important
means of crippling enemies and of raising revenue.47
A modern day civil forfeiture provision appears within The Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act.4 8 It, too, like the forfeiture stat-
utes during the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, is meant to cripple "en-
emies" and raise revenue. Toward this end, it incorporates admiralty
and custom law procedures. 49 Through these procedures, the govern-
ment can proceed against property in rem. 50 Since the government
proceeds against the "guilty" property and not against an individual,
in rem actions offer the government the benefit of conducting the pro-
ceedings in a civil arena where there is a lower burden of proof and
fewer constitutional protections.
The Supreme Court regularly has recited the "guilty property"
fiction as support for its holdings regarding the constitutionality of
forfeiture procedures. 51 The Court has stated that it is the thing that
has committed the offense.52 Since the property is the offender, the
45 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. See also Terrance 0. Reed & Joseph D. Gill, RICO
Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests" and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C. L. REv. 57 (1983) (giving
the history of the deodand).
46 Schecter, supra note 3, at 1153 (noting that the fifth statute passed by the first Ses-
sion of the United States Congress "provided for the forfeiture of ships when the owners
did not pay customs duties"). See also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683; Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
47 During the Revolutionary War, forfeiture statutes were an important means of taking
enemy property. Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 249; see, e.g., Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871) (permitting forfeiture of property of a northern rebel as an
exercise of Congress' war powers). Later, forfeiture statutes were used to seize Confeder-
ate property. Some commentators maintain "that were it not for these forfeitures, our
country might not exist in its current form today." Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 249.
48 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
49 21 U.S.C. § 881 (b)-(c) (1988). Although a criminal forfeiture provision also exists, it
is used less frequently. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
50 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct 2801, 2809 (1993).
51 See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (the Court's most
recent citing of the guilty property fiction); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (citing the history of the guilty property fiction); Various Items of
Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (distinguishing between in rem
and in personam actions); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510
(1921) (stating that it is the object that is the offender); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (12
Wheat.) (1827) (attributing the guilty property fiction to admiralty, commenting that
"[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender or rather the offense is attached
primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum or malum in se.").
52 J.W. GoldsmithJr.-Crant Co., 254 U.S. at 510.
[Vol. 86
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property is the defendant 5 3
Through the guilty property fiction, the government has been
able to pursue two different proceedings, criminal and civil; a pro-
ceeding in rem is fully independent of a proceeding in personam.
54
With the property as the defendant, the government arguably can cir-
cumvent rights granted to individuals charged with crimes.55 In this
way, civil forfeiture proceedings are similar to seventeenth century
English procedures; they "purge" the community of guilty "objects"
for the general good.
56
B. DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT
Under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, codified in
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)-(k), the United States government may seize all
monies used in drug transactions, properties used to contain, trans-
port, or facilitate the transportation of drugs, and real property which
facilitates drug transactions.57 In addition, all proceeds from such
transactions are subject to forfeiture.58 The government interprets
the term "proceeds" broadly to include all property that may have a
connection with drug transactions. 59
53 Id. (holding that "Congress interposes the core and responsibility of their owners in
and of the prohibition of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property a
certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong"). See also The Palmyra, 25
U.S. at 14-15; Calero-Toldo, 416 U.S. at 68-6; United States v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d
415, 419 (9th Cir. 1990).
54 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14-15 (1827). See also Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96
U.S. 395, 401 (1877) (holding that no guilt attaches to the person in in rem proceedings).
55 Sandra Guerra, Reconciling Federal Asset Forfeitures and Drug Offense Sentencing, 78
MiNm. L. REv. 805, 816 (1994).
56 A Senate Report states that the government needs "new approaches that will deal not
only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals
constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an
attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take
place on all available fronts . . . ." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969). Yet
sanctions imposed for acts that are "public wrongs" are usually criminal. See Kenneth
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
LJ. 1795, 1806 (1992). Mann distinguishes the typical criminal paradigm from the typical
civil paradigm by noting that the government imposes sanctions for criminal acts because
criminal acts are "public wrongs" while civil sanctions apply "to conduct that causes actual
damage to an individual interest...." Id. Thus, the criminal law has been characterized
as "an instrument for protecting the public." Id. at 1807. Because punitive civil sanctions
do not fit into either paradigm, they have been frequently challenged. Id. at 1813.
57 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1)-(7) (1988). It is irrelevant whether the drugs are meant to be
sold or are meant for personal use. See, e.g., United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku,
548 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that "the statutory language belies the argument
that the forfeiture provisions are limited to commercial trafficking, and the uniform course
ofjudicial decisions indicates that it is not the role of the courts to mitigate the harshness
of these statutes").
58 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6).
59 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) authorizes forfeiture of "all monies, negotiable instruments,
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The government's interest in the forfeited property vests at the
time of the illegal act; the forfeiture proceeding perfects this inter-
est.60 This is called the "relation back doctrine."6 1 It allows the gov-
ernment to take all traceable proceeds, including derivative proceeds,
such as interest, income, and dividends.
62
Property may be seized by the government through either an ad-
miralty or a statutory route.65 Once the government has seized the
property, it must follow the forfeiture proceeding outlined in the cus-
toms laws64 whereby the government may forfeit property through
either a summary or a judicial procedure. 65 Owners may purchase
back their property in a summary procedure or they may request a
judicial proceeding.66 To initiate ajudicial proceeding, they must file
a claim establishing their ownership interest, and demonstrate stand-
ing.6 7 Only then must the government prove that it had probable
cause to seize the property.
68
Courts have defined the government's burden of probable cause
loosely;69 to establish a prima facie case, the government need only
securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance... [and] all proceeds traceable to such an exchange
60 "All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) shall vest in the
United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." 21
U.S.C. 881(h) (1988). But see United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993)
(weakening the relation back doctrine by holding that a government's title in property is
not self-executing and does apply until the government perfects its title in the property by
obtaining a forfeiture order).
61 In Buena Vista, Scalia describes the "relation back doctrine" as "a doctrine of retroac-
tive vesting of title that takes effect only upon entry of the judicial order of forfeiture or
condemnation." 113 S. Ct. at 1128.
62 See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 675 F. Supp. 645 (D. Fla. 1987) (Nar-
cotics traffickers used their profits to buy property in North Carolina. Later they sold this
property and bought real estate in Florida. The government seized the Florida property as
derivative proceeds.).
63 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). See Schecter, supra note 3, 1167-68 (discussing the consti-
tutionality of the use of admiralty rules in forfeiture proceedings).
64 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988).
65 19 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
66 Id. § 1607.
67 Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Rule C(6) (1988).
68 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988); see, e.g., United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d
1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989). Constitutional challenges to the probable cause standard have
not been successful. See United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 15-
16 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); United States v. United States Cur-
rency Totaling $87,279, 545 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. Ga 1982) (finding that the test for deter-
mining probable cause for forfeitures is the same as the test applied to arrests, searches,
and seizures).
69 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (finding that "probable cause" is
not a technical term but involves "probabilities" and "[t] he standard of proof is accordingly
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introduce evidence that establishes a "reasonable ground for belief
[that the property is narcotics proceeds], supported by less than
prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion."70 Courts find
probable cause under a "totality of the circumstances standard."71
The rules of evidence are relaxed for this purpose. Often circumstan-
tial evidence will show probable cause.7 2 Hearsay evidence is also
admissible,73 and evidence acquired after the seizure of the property
may also be used.74 Additionally, the prosecutor does not need to
introduce evidence establishing a direct connection between the
seized property and the illegal activity.7 5 Only after a claimant
presents her evidence must the government produce "trial-quality"
evidence.
76
After the government shows probable cause, the burden shifts to
the claimant.7 7 She must show that the property is not subject to for-
feiture by a preponderance of the evidence. 78 Unlike the govern-
correlative to what must be proved").
70 See, e.g., United States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1987). The
standard for probable cause is similar to the standard for obtaining a search warrant. See,
e.g., United States v. $191,910.00 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1071 (9th Cir.
1994); United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir.
1990).
71 United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing a district court
who denied forfeiture after considering the evidence piecemeal because "parsing evidence
in isolation for a fatal flaw threatened to transform the standard of 'probable cause' into a
steep threshold requirement that would impede the operation of forfeiture statutes.").
The probable cause standard is not totally favorable to the government. See Leach & Mal-
colm, supra note 1, at 255. Sometimes courts do not allow the government to present their
probable cause evidence to a jury. Id. at 256. The judge makes a legal determination
regarding the government's evidence and informs the jury. Id. Then the claimant
presents her evidence. Id.
72 See, e.g., United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Edward, 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989).
73 See, e.g., United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.
1982); Ted's Motors v. United States, 217 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1954).
74 United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1439 n.24 (11th Cir.
1991).
75 Id.; United States v. $5,644,540.00 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars, 762 F.2d
895 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986). But see 124 CONG. REc. 34,671
(1978) (Thejoint House-Senate explanation of the Senate amendment states that "due to
the penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the intent of these provisions that property
would be forfeited only if there is a substantial connection between the property and the
underlying criminal activity which the statute seeks to prevent.").
76 Admissible evidence is evidence that meets the standards of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Mann, supra note 56, at
1810-12 (arguing the procedural differences between civil and criminal law are based on
the different public interests "implicated by wrongful conduct").
77 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
78 United States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1994). The
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ment, a claimant may not use hearsay evidence to meet her burden.79
To reclaim her property she must prove that her property is not
"guilty" by establishing one of the following: she had no knowledge of
the drug violation and she did everything she reasonably could to pre-
vent the violation from occurring;80 the property was stolen or it is a
common carrier;8' or there is no traceable connection between the
property and unlawful drug transactions.8 2 Only "innocent" owners of
real estate or conveyances are exempt from forfeiture if they can
prove their lack of knowledge or consent.8 3
Since these are affirmative defenses regarding knowledge,8 4 the
claimant faces a dilemma; if she fails to answer the pleading or comply
with discovery, she may waive her right to testify at trial.85 Yet if she
circuit courts have found that the shifting of the burden of proof is not unconstitutional
because of the historically civil nature of forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., United States v. San-
toro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989) (Congress may constitutionally alter the bur-
den of proof in civil proceedings).
79 FED. R. EvID. 802 (hearsay not admissible). However, if the claimant's evidence falls
under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, it may be admissible. See FED. R. EvD.
803, 804 (listing hearsay exceptions).
80 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(6)-(7) (1988) (establishing an innocent owner de-
fense); see also United States v. One Parcel of Land Known as Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443,
1445 (9th Cir. 1990).
81 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (A)-(B), (a) (7) (providing exceptions for common carriers
and stolen property).
82 Id. at § 881 (a) (6)-(7). The "innocent owner" provision is often interpreted narrowly.
See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414
(10th Cir. 1982). The court found that the owner was not an innocent owner within the
scope of the provision because the owner had been negligent. Id. at 418. The owner took
possession of the plane as collateral for a defaulted loan but left it in a hanger. Id. at 415-
16. When the plane was used for a drug run, the owner could not prove that it was stolen.
Id. The court found that the owner had not "done all that could reasonably be done" to
protect against the illegal use. Id. at 418. But see United States v. Four Million, Two Hun-
dred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the "innocent
owner" defense depends on claimants' actual, not constructive, knowledge), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1056 (1986); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90
(1974) (stating in dicta that it may be unconstitutional to seize an "exceptionally innocent"
owner's property).
83 An innocent owner is one who had not consented or had knowledge of the illegal
use of her property. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (C), (a) (6)-(7) (1988). Note that some civil
forfeiture statutes do not have innocent owner provisions. If such statutes are considered
remedial, then an innocent owner is not protected from forfeiture of her property. See
Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (Five to four decision with no
majority opinion holding that an innocent owner was not protected from civil forfeiture
under the Due Process or the Takings Clause).
84 It is constitutional to put the burden of an affirmative defense on a defendant. Pat-
terson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). Although the government is required to
prove every element of the charged offense, it is not required to prove the absence of an
affirmative defense. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795-96 (1952).
85 If the owner files a claim, she will give the government her identity, which may lead
to criminal charges. But if she does not file a claim, she has no standing to pursue her
ownership interests, and the property will be lost to her by default. See United States v.
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does not answer, she cannot establish a defense to the forfeiture.8 6
More importantly, if she answers, she may incriminate herself with re-
gard to any criminal proceedings that either have been filed, or will
be filed.87 Generally, courts have held that the civil proceeding does
not bar the criminal proceeding because the civil proceeding does not
require a showing of intent.88 This dilemma has burdened the claim-
ant's right to silence.89
IV. FiFTH AMENDMENT
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A review of the history of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination demonstrates that it evolved as a means to prevent
governments from abusing their power. Prior to the establishment of
the Fifth Amendment, governments regularly forced self-incriminat-
ing information from its citizens. Frequently, the government derived
information from no more than an individual's silence, which they
interpreted as a confession.
The Fifth Amendment's origins can be traced to English law.90 It
$321,470.00 in United States Currency, 874 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars, 703 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1984). Improperly filed claims,
i.e. claims with conclusory allegations, may be struck as insufficient. SeeMercado v. United
States Customs Service, 873 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1989). If a substitute claim is not filed
promptly, the property is forfeited. Id.
86 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983); United States v. United States
Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-23 (1971). See also United States v. One 1975 Ford
Pickup Truck, 558 F.2d 755, 756-57 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an unrebutted showing
of probable cause sustains forfeiture). However, invocation of the "innocent owner" de-
fense may waive a claimant's other privileges. United States v. 281 Syosset Woodbury Road,
862 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that invoking the innocent owner de-
fense waives the marital communication privilege. The court found further that an adverse
inference may be drawn from a refusal to waive the confidential marital communications
privilege.).
87 See United States v. $250,000 in U.S. Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900-01 n.22 (1st Cir.
1987) (describing the dilemma the claimant faced by noting that if the claimant "could
prove that the money was proceeds from jewel thefts [and not narcotics], it would not be
subject to forfeiture, but [the claimant] would have subjected to himself to prosecution for
theft").
88 SeeVarious Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931) (follow-
ing an unsuccessful criminal prosecution with a civil forfeiture action does not constitute
DoubleJeopardy); see also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234
(1972). For this reason, as well as the lower burden of proof, civil forfeitures have no
collateral estoppel effect on criminal proceedings. See United States v. U.S. Currency in
the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990).
89 See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that the "mere existence of a
parallel proceeding is not a compulsion to testify protected by the Fifth Amendment"). In
Williams v. Florida, 299 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitu-
tional to burden a defendant's right of silence.
90 LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FrFTH AMENDMENT 42 (2d ed. 1986).
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developed during the sixteenth century as a resistance to heresy pro-
ceedings in the English ecclesiastical courts. 91 When heresy became
more prevalent in England in the late fourteenth century, English ec-
clesiastic courts began to use the oath ex officio.92 The oath ex officio
came from the inquisitio proceedings that dominated the European
continent.93 In the European proceeding the judge played the role of
accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury.94 Before the proceeding, the
suspect swore the oath ex officio, which required the suspect to tell the
truth to all interrogatories. 95 The court compelled the witness to take
this oath without knowing the charges, the accusers, or the
evidence. 96
In these proceedings the defendant had the burden of proof; she
had to establish her innocence. 97 Yet the oath provoked self-incrimi-
nation.98 If the witness did not take the oath, under the pro confesso
rule she was believed guilty. If she did take the oath, she risked being
accused of perjury if she did not answer in the expected manner.99
Initial opposition to the oath came primarily from the civil courts
91 Id.
92 In 1401 the statute "DeHaeretico Comburnedo," also known as the "Statute ex officio" was
passed. LEvY, supra note 90, at 57. The statute gave the ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction
over all heretics. Id. at 58-59. The statute "effectively introduced the Inquisition to Eng-
land." MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FiFrH 8 (2d ed. 1980). De Haeretico Comburnedo was en-
acted in response to Lollardy. Id. at 8. Lollardy developed from the teachings of John
Wycliff. LEvY, supra note 90, at 54. Wycliff attacked the authority of the Pope and priest-
hood, denied transubstantiation, and translated the Scriptures into English. Id De Haeret-
ico Comburnedo allowed the burning of these "heretics." BERGER, supra, at 8. With the
state's support, the ecclesiastical courts used the oath interrogation as an important proce-
dural technique. Id.
93 LEvy, supra note 90, at 42. The inquisitio originated on the European continent dur-
ing the end of the twelfth century as a method of discovering and punishing misconduct in
the clergy and later, was adopted to eradicate heresy. Id. at 20-37.
94 Id. at 23.
95 The oath was originally known as the oath de veritate dicenda, but because it became
associated with a proceeding in which "the judged served ex officio as indicator, assailant,
and convictor," it was also called the oath ex officio. LEvY, supra note 90, at 23-24.
96 Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 92, at 6.
97 BERGER, supra note 92, at 38.
98 Refusal to take the oath ex officio sometimes resulted in an individual being held pro
confesso (as though she confessed) and convicto (convicted for the crime charged). LEVY,
supra note 90, at 32. However, generally the prisoner was punished only for contempt of
court. Id. The silence of individuals who refused to respond to any questions after taking
the oath was also taken as pro confesso. Id. at 55 (discussing the trial in 1392 ofJohn Ash-
ton) and at 75 (discussing the conviction in 1549 of Edmund Bonner, Bishop of London).
99 LEw, supra note 90, at 23-24. After Henry VIII repudiated the Pope, Sir Thomas
More was executed for his failure to take the Oath of Supremacy and the oath ex officio. Id.
at 69. He reportedly said, "thei offred me an othe by which I shoulde be sworen to make
true aunswere to suche thinges as shoulde be asked me on the Kinges behalfe, concerning
the Kinges owne person .... Whereto I aunswered that verily I never purposed to swere
any nooke othe more while I lived." Id. at 70.
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who felt that the ecclesiastical courts were infringing on theirjurisdic-
tion.100 The first recorded instance of someone objecting to the pro-
cedure and claiming an early form of the American Fifth Amendment
occurred in 1532.101 Widespread resistance to the oath did not begin
until 1554, when large numbers of Anglicans and Puritans were tried
as heretics during the reign of Mary J.102
Puritans refused to take the oath for many reasons. Some be-
lieved that the oath was barred by the Magna Charta's "law of the
land" clause. 103 Some adopted the stance of the civil courts, arguing
that the thirteen century common law prohibited ecclesiastical en-
croachment on civil court jurisdiction. 0 4 Others contested that the
common law forbade forcing self-incrimination. 0 5 And still others re-
fused to take the oath on moral grounds. 10 6
In 1606, the appointment of Sir Edward Coke as chiefjustice of
100 Id. at 12. See also Lisa Tarello, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End Its Silence on the Rationale Behind
The Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 137, 140 (1992).
101 In 1532,John Lambert, who died at the stake, refused to answer by sworn statement
one of the 45 articles charging him with Protestant convictions. LEw, supra note 90, at 3.
He stated "though I did remember ... yet were I more than twice a fool to show you
thereof; for it is written in your own law, 'No man is bound to bewray [accuse] himself.'"
Id.
102 Mary I established the Court of High Commission which functioned as the ecclesias-
tical branch of the Privy Council and the Star Chamber. Law, supra note 90, at 76. She
charged the Commission with inquiring into all heresies, including offenses against the
church, offenses in the church, offenses against church property, failure to attend church,
and all seditious words. Id. The letters creating the commission gave the commission dis-
cretionary power. Id. Extensive vocal opposition to the oath ex officio began in 1583 when
Elizabeth I, following Mary's example, began using the High Commission to purge the
country of heretics. BERGER, supra note 92, at 9-11. The High Commission had limited
powers. It could imprison but it could not convict those that refused to take the oath-
only the Star Chamber had the power to convict. Id. at 12. Opposition was usually futile.
Id. Although Star Chamber proceedings had many common law protections, the oath
could be administered in all but capital cases. Id.
103 BERGER, supra note 92, at 13. The Magna Charta stated: "No Freeman shall be taken,
or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be out-
lawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; now will we not pass upon him, nor condemn
him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land." In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 378-79 (1970) (citing 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225)).
104 BERGER, supra note 92, at 12.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 13. In a trial for harboring the Jesuit, Father Edmund Campion, Sir Thomas
Tresham stated:
For if I sweare falselie, I am perjured; if by my othe I accuse myselfe, I am condemned
to the penaltie of the law and displeasure of my prince, which is contrarye to the law of
nature seipsum prodere .... Secondlie, I should greatiie synne uncharitablye to belye
hym, to make hym and myselfe both, guyltie by my othe, who to my knowledge ar most
innocent, which I am by Gods worde expreslie forbidden. Lastlie I should committ a
grevous synne to sweare against the knowledge of my owne conscience ....
Law, supra note 90, at 103.
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the Court of Common Pleas resulted in more resistance to the oath ex
officio.1 07 During Coke's tenure, he, as well as common lawjudges and
members of Parliament, promoted the Latin maxim nemo tenetur seip-
sum prodere-no one is bound to accuse himself.108 Their efforts met
with some success. Their long campaign against the oath in England
stimulated a growing belief that the oath was unjust because it violated
human dignity and the human instinct for self-preservation by requir-
ing defendants to accuse themselves. 10 9
Nonetheless, even at common law, the right against self-incrimi-
nation was limited." 0 Although defendants could not be forced to
answer, the prosecutor and the judge could construe their silence ad-
versely.11 More importantly, the indictment was a prima facie case
against the defendant-there was no authentic presumption of inno-
cence. 112 One commentator argues that if the defendant claimed his
right to silence, "he could rely on a verdict of guilty," meaning that
"accused persons, whether in ecclesiastical or common-law courts still
had no meaningful right against compulsory self-incrimination."
1 3
In 1662, enacted legislation forbade the use of the oath in any
proceeding on the grounds that compelled self-accusation was un-
fair.' 14 Simultaneously, criminal procedures adopted civil rules that
barred a party in interest from testifying;1 5 interested parties were
deemed untrustworthy." 6 Compulsory interrogation became point-
less since an accused could not testify for or against herself." 7
Although the right against self-incrimination is part of America's
common law inheritance from England, its transition into America
107 In 1616 Coke tried Burrowes and Others v. The High Commission. LEw, supra note
90, at 254-55. He decided to make it the leading case on the oath ex offwio. Id. at 254.
Eight Puritan layman had been imprisoned for holding private conventicles, refusing to
kneel at communion, and other crimes. Id. Coke argued that the High Commission could
not examine on oath; it was lawful only in matrimonial and testamentary cases. Id. at 255.
If they testified under oath they would subject themselves to the danger of a penal law. Id.
108 BERGER, supra note 92, at 14.
109 Law, supra note 90, at 263.
110 Id. at 264.
ill Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 265.
114 The trial ofJohn Lilburne in 1637 for sending seditious books from Holland to Eng-
land was the catalyst that led to the eventual ban of the oath ex officio. LEw, supra note 90,
at 271-72. Lilburne refused to take the oath, stating "I understand, that this Oath is one
and the same with the High Commission Oath, which Oath I know to be both against the
law of God and the law of the land; and therefore in brief I dare not take the oath, though
I suffer death for the refusal of it." BERGER, supra note 92, at 17.
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was not smooth.118 Some American colonies had been established
before the right became fixed in English common law.119 Neither the
Star Chamber nor the High Commission courts-courts which regu-
larily compelled self-incrimination-were imported into America; this
deprived the American colonies of a symbol around which to coalesce
a movement against self-incrimination. 120 Consequently, American
colonies did not respect the right against self-incrimination with any
consistency.
121
Congressman James Madison framed the first American version
of the right against self-incrimination. 122 This version would have
given the right to parties in both civil and criminal proceedings. 23
However, the House of Representatives amended it so that today it
applies only to criminal matters. 124
B. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY
Today, protected language includes any communication that "re-
late[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information." 125 Whenever
testimony may implicate a person in criminal acts or "furnish a link in
the chain of evidence to prosecute" her, she may invoke the privi-
lege126 as long as it is done in good faith. 12 7 If the court questions
whether there is any actual danger of self-incrimination, she must pro-
vide a foundation showing that there'is a "reasonable possibility" that
118 See id.; LEw, supra note 90, at 333; Tarello, supra note 100, at 141.
119 Lv, supra note 90, at 333.
120 BERGER, supra note 92, at 21.
121 Id. The oath ev officio was adopted in some colonies as a means of suppressing diver-
gent religions. See Tarello, supra note 100, at 141. The first mention of the right against
self-incrimination occurs in 1637 in Virginia where ReverendJohn Wheelwright was prose-
cuted for his Antinomian beliefs. L&, supra note 90, at 340-41. When he was told that
the interrogation would be conducted ex officio, he objected. Id. at 341. However, he ob-
jected because of the association of the term ex officio with the High Commission. Id. at
341-42. Wheelright did not try to claim a substantial right against self-incrimination. Id. at
343. After the court assured him that their purpose was not to elicit "involuntary" admis-
sions from him, he responded freely to almost all of their questions. I.
122 The first "self-incrimination" clause appeared in the Virginia Bill of Rights. BERGER,
supra note 92, at 22.
123 Id. at 23.
124 Id. The privilege has never been interpreted narrowly. See BERGER, supra note 92, at
50. Moreover, if the amendment had been interpreted literally, it would be hard to see any
justification for it because at the time it was adopted, mostjurisdictions prevented defend-
ants from testifying in their own trials. Id.
125 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). The privilege is available "in any
proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative orjudicial, investigatory or adjudicatory."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
126 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
127 Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 214 (lst Cir. 1954) (holding that taking the
privilege in bad faith constitutes perjury).
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answering will self-incriminate. 28
The policies behind the Fifth Amendment are not as clear.
Once, the Fifth Amendment was believed to safeguard the truth.
29
This rationale stemmed from a belief that if a court compelled a de-
fendant to answer, she might be tempted to perjure herself.180 An-
other factor behind the amendment was the worry that if the
defendant did answer, the jury might give her answers, which would
be self-interested, undue weight.
131
However, in Tehan v. United States ex re. Short,132 the Court found
that "the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not
an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," nor was its basic purpose to
protect the innocent.133 Since Tehan, the Court has characterized the
Fifth Amendment as a "private enclave" whereby a citizen may "create
a zone of privacy which the government may not force him to surren-
der to his detriment."134 Today, the Fifth Amendment is believed to
function as a shield against the government's sword. 135 Through her
right to silence, the individual can better establish a balance of power
between herself and the state.'
36
V. THE IMPACT OF FORFEITURE ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. FORFEITURE AS A QUASI-CRIMINAL ACTION
The first Supreme Court case to discuss the Fifth Amendment
dilemma in forfeiture proceedings was Boyd v. United States.137 In Boyd,
128 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87 (finding that the witness need only show "that a respon-
sive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dan-
gerous because injurious disclosure could result"). See also BERGER, supra note 92, at 91-92
(discussing the Hoffman holding).
129 BERGER, supra note 92, at 29-30. When the First Congress originally considered the
Bill of Rights, the defendant could not testify at her trial because her interest in the results
made her testimony unreliable. Id. at 50. See also Tarello, supra note 100, at 140 n.54.
130 See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977) (feeling compelled to answer, a Chi-
nese woman perjured herself in front of a grand jury).
131 BERGER, supra note 92, at 30.
132 882 U.S. 406 (1966).
133 Id. at 415-16. In Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955), the Supreme Court
stated that the Fifth Amendment is "a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the
guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions." Id. at 162.
134 Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
135 But see Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (stating that the fundamen-
tal purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is the preservation of an adversarial
system of criminal justice).
136 See discussion and analysis of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), infrasection
V.A. See also BERGER, supra note 92, at 40 (noting that "the law's preference for an accusa-
torial system of justice simply reflects a commitment to retain that balance [of power be-
tween the state and the individual].").
137 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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the government seized thirty-five cases of plate glass for violations of
the customs revenue laws. 138 During the trial the claimants were or-
dered to produce an invoice of twenty-nine cases of glass previously
imported into the United States.' 3 9 Although the claimants objected,
arguing that compelling production of evidence from claimants in a
forfeiture case to incriminate them was unconstitutional, they pro-
duced the invoice.' 40 The jury found for the United States; the thirty-
five plates of glass were forfeited.'
41
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded 42 The
Court reasoned that the customs statute compelled the production of
the documents.' 43 If the claimants failed to produce them, the claim-
ants would be considered guilty.'44 In other words, their silence
would be construed as a confession. 145 Moreover, the actions that re-
sulted in the forfeiture could have resulted in criminal charges. 146
There was a strong possibility that if the claimant or owner testified,
she would incriminate herself.147 The Boyd Court found that forfei-
ture actions are "in their nature criminal,"' 48 or quasi-criminal; 149
138 Id. at 617. The customs law violated was 18 Stat. 186 (1874). It stated:
[A]ny owner, importer, consignee, & c., who shall, with intent to defraud the revenue,
make or attempt to make, any entry of imported merchandise, by means of any fraud-
ulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter or paper, or by means of any false statement
written or verbal, or who shall be guilty of an wilful act or omission, by means whereof
the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accru-
ing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such
invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, shall
for each offence be fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or be
imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both; and, in addition to such
fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited.
Id.
139 Id. at 618.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 638.
143 Id. at 621-22.
144 Id.
145 Historically, the statute was like the oath ex officio since it allowed an allegation to be
taken as confessed if the claimant or defendant did not produce the required papers. The
statute stated that "the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as confessed,
unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to the satisfaction of
the court." Id. at 620.
146 Id. at 634.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 The Court has distinguished between civil and quasi-criminal proceedings by apply-
ing a three prong test. Courts must ask: 1) is there is a separate criminal proceeding?; 2)
will the proceedings prejudice the defendant in later criminal proceedings?; and 3) is
there is any evidence of "countervailing punitive purpose or effect... ?" United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980). See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (discussing a seven prong test for distinguishing between
civil and criminal proceedings). One commentator has found the "quasi-criminal" label
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therefore, certain Fifth Amendment protections apply. 150 An owner
or claimant, who is a substantial party, retains all privileges awarded to
criminal defendants. 15 '
The Boyd opinion focused on an individual's right to feel secure
in both his person and property. 52 Writing for the Court, Justice
Bradley traced the similarities between the abuse of early American
civil rights and the infringement upon Boyd's Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights. 153 The Boyd Court recognized that individuals
must be shielded from arbitrary power with full constitutional protec-
tion.' 5 4 Toward that end, the Boyd Court recommended that "consti-
tutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed." 155
The Court expanded Boyd's scope in United States v. United States
Coin and Currency'5 6 when it held that gamblers could raise the Fifth
Amendment privilege in a civil action for failure to file statutorily re-
quired forms.157 The Court found that there was a "substantial" risk
that the forms would incriminate the gamblers.15 8 The gambling stat-
ute contained an innocent owner provision allowing individuals to pe-
tition for the return of their property. Through this provision, the
Court inferred a scienter of negligence.' 5 9 Since guilt or innocence
was an element of the forfeiture action, 160 the Court found that the
forfeiture statute, when viewed in its entirety, was intended to penalize
only those "significantly" involved in a criminal enterprise. 161 For
problematic. See Schecter, supra note 3, at 1159-60. Schecter notes that there is no hierar-
chy of the constitutional rights granted a criminal defendant; when courts grant or with-
hold constitutional rights to forfeiture claimants, they do so at their discretion. Id. at 1159-
60. Therefore, either courts grant forfeiture claimants too many constitutional rights or
too few. Id.
150 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
151 Id. at 638.
152 Id. at 635.
153 Id. at 624-30.
154 Justice Bradley speculated that the Framers relied on Lord Camden's opinion in
Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 when com-
posing the Bill of Rights. Id. at 626. Justice Bradley showed how Camden traced general
warrants for search and seizures to the Star Chamber and denounced unreasonable search
and seizures as displays of arbitrary power, equating unreasonable search and seizures with
self-incrimination. Id. at 627.29.
155 The rest of the quote reads "[a] close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Id. at 635.
156 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
157 Id. at 721-22.
158 Id. at 717-18.
'59 Id. at 719-21.
160 Id. at 721-22.
161 Id.
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Fifth Amendment purposes the action was a criminal proceeding 62
and, therefore, the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional.
163
The innocent owner provision within 21 U.S.C. § 881 would seem
to indicate that claimants should receive the same protections
awarded to the Coin and Currency claimants. Although the gambling
statute at issue in Coin and Currency contained a self-reporting require-
ment, and § 881 does not, § 881 does require that an owner affirma-
tively prove her innocence to obtain her property. 64 If under
§ 881165 an owner can establish that she was completely "innocent" of
any knowledge or negligence with regard to the illegal use of her
property, her property will not be forfeited. 166 Thus, guilt or inno-
cence is a significant element with regard to an owner's ability to re-
tain her property.
Proving one's innocence requires reporting on one's activities.
167
To prove innocence an individual must establish that she acquired the
property in another way or that she had no knowledge of its unlawful
use.lea An individual's activities may not always be innocent or law-
ful' 69 For example, the property may not be the proceeds of illegal
narcotics activity but may be the proceeds of some other illegal activ-
ity.17 0 Requiring a claimant to report on the origin of her property or
her lack of knowledge requires her to self-report. 171 Thus, it appears
as though the rationale underlying the holding that, for Fifth Amend-
ment purposes, the Coin and Currency statute initiated a criminal pro-
ceeding would also indicate that, for Fifth Amendment purposes, the
forfeiture proceedings in the Drug Abuse and Prevention Act are also
criminal.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 724.
164 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a) (6)-(7) (1988). See, e.g., United States v. Two Parcels of
Real Property Located in Russell County, Alabama, 868 F. Supp. 306, 311-13 (M.D. Ala.
1994) (granting summary judgment because claimants did not prove that their property
had been purchased by honestly earned income).
165 See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (C), (a)(6)-(7).
166 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993) (finding that the innocent
owner defense in § 881 implies some measure of guilt in an owner). But see Bennis v.
Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (refusing to import a culpability require-
ment for a strict liability civil forfeiture statute characterized as remedial).
167 SeeTwo Parcels of Real Property Located in Russell County, Alabama, 868 F. Supp. at
311-13; but see United States v. Premises Located at Highway 13/5 Phil Campbell, (Parcel
2), 747 F. Supp. 641, 649-50 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (commenting that a claimant who is a crimi-
nal target "cannot be placed in the position of having to make the Hobson's choice be-
tween relinquishing valuable real property on the one hand, and seriously exposing
himself to possible self-incrimination on the other").
168 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C), (a)(6)-(7) (1988).
169 See supra note 88.
170 Id.
171 See discussion supra section EI.B.
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While Coin and Currency focused on the scienter of the claimant,
Garrity v. New Jersey'72 addressed the meaning of "coercion." In Garrity,
the appellants were police officers.1 73 During an investigation by the
Attorney General they were told that: 1) they could refuse to answer
his questions; 2) refusal to answer would mean forfeiture of their em-
ployment; and 3) anything they said could be used against them in
criminal proceedings. 174 Later, though they objected, the appellants'
statements were used against them in criminal prosecutions.17 5
The Supreme Court held that the appellants' Fifth Amendment
rights had been violated because the state had compelled the incrimi-
nating statements used in the criminal proceedings. 7 6 The Court
held that in order to determine the issue of coercion, courts must ask
whether the accused had a "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse
to answer."1 77 In Garrity, appellants' could not freely choose whether
or not to answer because the choice offered to them-either to forfeit
their jobs or incriminate themselves-unduly pressured them. 78 The
Court refuted the government's argument that a police officer's em-
ployment contract was conditioned on her agreement to perform the
job as required, stating "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination
would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as
equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption
of perjury .... -179
Expanding Garrity, LeJkowitz v. Cunningham'80 pointed out that
the touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and "direct
economic sanctions and imprisonment are not the only penalties ca-
pable of forcing the self-incrimination that the Amendment for-
bids."'181 In a grand jury proceeding, the appellant in Lejkowitz refused
to sign a waiver of immunity of his Fifth Amendment right not to in-
criminate himself.' 82 Consequently, he was divested of all of his party
offices and was banned from holding any public or party office for five
years.1
8 3
172 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
173 Id. at 500.
174 Id. at 494.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 495.
177 Id. at 497 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241, reh'g denied 315 U.S. 826
(1942).
178 Id. at 496. The Court reasoned that "[w]here the choice is 'between the rock and
the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to waive one or the other." Id. at 498.
179 Id. at 498-500.
180 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
181 Id. at 806.
182 Id. at 803-04.
183 Id.
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The Court held that a state cannot impose sanctions for invoking
the Fifth Amendment right' 84 nor may a citizen be forced to surren-
der the Fifth Amendment privilege to serve a governmental need.185
The Court distinguished LeJkowitz from an earlier case, Baxter v.
Palmigiano, by singling out the "automatic" imposition of a penalty in
Lejkowitz as being one of its most important differentiating
characteristics. 18
6
Between the Boyd holding that constitutional rights should be
construed liberally, and the holdings in Garrity-Lejkowitz, a claimant
should be able to take her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in any forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881
without fear that the court could construe her silence adversely. Ac-
cording to Garrity-LeJkowitz, the government cannot take a property
right from a claimant in order to compel testimony,187 nor may the
government impose automatic sanctions in retaliation for a claimant's
silence.188 An adverse inference from a claimant's use of her Fifth
Amendment privilege is similar to an automatic sanction. 189 If a
claimant does not give up her right to silence, she will lose her prop-
erty because she cannot rebut the government's probable cause that
her property is guilty of drug activity. 190 If she does give up her right,
any information she gives may be used in a parallel criminal
proceeding. 191
Despite the constitutional safeguards that Garrity-Lekowitz seem to
erect for forfeiture claimants, circuit courts have permitted adverse
inferences against claimants who invoke the Fifth Amendment. 9 2
Circuit courts have construed the Garrity-Lekowitz holdings nar-
rowly.193 Citing the Supreme Court's holdings in Baxter v. Palmigiano
and United States v. Rylander, circuit courts have limited the Fifth
Amendment right under 21 U.S.C. § 881.194
184 Id. at 805.
185 Id. at 808 n.5.
186 The Court stated that only when an individual's silence is "one of a number of fac-
tors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty" may a court permit an
adverse inference. Id.
187 Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493, 495-96 (1967).
188 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977).
189 See supra notes 85-87, 178 and accompanying text.
190 United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that an unrebut-
ted showing of probable cause is enough to sustain forfeiture); see discussion of claimant's
dilemma, supra section II.B.
191 See supra note 11-12 and accompanying text.





B. ADVERSE INFERENCES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
An analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in Baxter v. Palmigi-
ano'95 and United States v. Rylander 96 has led some of the circuit courts
to conclude that the Garrity-Lekowitz line of cases are not dispositive of
the Fifth Amendment right of claimants in narcotics forfeiture pro-
ceedings.1 97 Circuit courts have interpreted the Baxter-Rylander cases
as considerably narrowing the Fifth Amendment privileges outlined in
the Garrity-Lejkowitz cases.' 98 Specifically, courts have cited Baxter to
support their holdings that an adverse inference may be taken from a
claimant's silence in a civil forfeiture proceeding.
99
In Baxter, a state prison inmate was charged with initiating a dis-
turbance that could have led to a riot.200 After being informed by the
prison disciplinary board that he could be prosecuted for violation of
a state statute, the inmate was told that he could remain silent during
the hearing, but that his silence would be construed adversely.
20'
Although the Board advised him to consult his attorney, it did not
permit his attorney to be present during the hearing.20 2 The discipli-
nary hearing took place before any criminal charge was filed.
2 0 3
Forced to choose between remaining silent so as not to incriminate
himself in any subsequent criminal action or defending himself by tes-
tifying, the inmate chose silence.204 Subsequently, the Board put the
inmate in "punitive segregation" for thirty days and downgraded his
classification. 20
5
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Board, finding
that the Fifth Amendment permits adverse inferences in civil actions
when parties do not testify in response to probative evidence. 20 6 The
Court distinguished the Garrity-Le/kowitz cases by pointing out that in
Baxter, there was no automatic penalty when the inmate claimed his
right to silence-the discipline was imposed only upon consideration
'95 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
196 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
197 United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
198 See, e.g., A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 630 (11th Cir. 1986).
199 See, e.g., id.
200 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 313.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 317.
204 Id. at 313.
205 Id.
206 The Court stated: "This does not smack of an invalid attempt by the State to compel
testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exercise of the privilege." Id. at
318.
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of all of the evidence, 20 7 and there had to be a showing of "substantial
evidence." 208 The Court emphasized that it is constitutional to take
an individual's property based on presented evidence, but it is uncon-
stitutional to take an individual's property simply because he will not
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege.20 9 The Baxter Court found addi-
tional support for its holding in the important state interests that state
prison disciplinary hearings serve.
2 10
Since an owner bears the burden of proof in establishing an af-
firmative defense, United States v. Rylandea2" must be read in conjunc-
tion with Baxter. In Rylander, the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's finding that a corporation's president was in contempt for fail-
ing to produce corporate documents subpoenaed by the IRS.212 The
Court noted that Rylander's only defense to the contempt charge was
that he did not have the documents.2 13 For this defense, Rylander
had the burden of production.2 14 Rylander's invocation of the Fifth
Amendment during cross examination prevented him from satisfying
his burden.
215
Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Rehnquist said that the Fifth
Amendment has "never been thought to be in itself a substitute for
evidence that would assist in meeting the burden of production."216
To allow the Fifth Amendment to be used in this way "would convert
the privilege from the shield against compulsory self-incrimination...
to a sword .... 2 1 7
Together, Baxter and Rylander have been cited for the proposition
that adverse inferences are permissible when a claimant takes the
207 The Court commented:
[T]his case is very different from the circumstances before the Court in the Garriky-
Leflowitz decisions, where refusal to submit to interrogation and to waive a Fifth
Amendment privilege, standing alone and without regard to the other evidence, re-
sulted in loss of employment or opportunity to contract with the State. There, failure
to respond to interrogations was treated as a final admission of guilt. Here Palmigiano
remained silent at the hearing in the face of evidence that incriminated him; and, as
far as this record reveals, his silence was given no more evidentiary value than was
warranted by the facts surrounding the case.
Id. at 317-18.
208 Id. at 317.
209 The Court found that a prison disciplinary proceeding was not a criminal procedure.
I& at 317. Therefore, it declined to extend the Griffin ruling barring adverse inferences in
criminal cases. Id. See generally Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
210 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317.
211 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
212 Id. at 761.
213 Id. at 760-61.
214 Id. at 756.
215 Id.




Fifth Amendment in a forfeiture proceeding.218 Courts reason that
the owner's "innocence" is an affirmative defense that she has the bur-
den of proving.2 19 She cannot sustain this burden by refusing to an-
swer based on her Fifth Amendment rights.22
0
The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted these holdings to mean that
a negative inference may be drawn in a civil forfeiture action when a
claimant takes the Fifth Amendment, as long as the court's final judg-
ment is not based solely on the negative inference. 22 1 Although the
Second Circuit has not committed itself on this issue, it has speculated
that negative inferences may be impermissible within the forfeiture
context "given the severity of the deprivation at risk."222 In contrast,
the Sixth Circuit has held that a negative inference may not be drawn
in a civil forfeiture proceeding if the inference could "harm" the
claimant in a parallel criminal action.
2 23
The Sixth Circuit found that since the forfeiture provisions ap-
pear within the criminal code, and since they are intended to impose
a penalty only on those "significantly involved in a criminal enter-
prise," claimants have the same safeguards as criminal defendants-
including the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the right to remain silent-without automatically suffering
forfeiture of their property.22
4
Arguably, the Second and the Eleventh Circuits misread Baxter
and Rylander. Two important factors are missing in narcotics civil for-
feiture proceedings that were present in Baxter 1) the Court found
the state had an "important state interest" in maintaining discipline
within its prison system; 225 and 2) the Court found the adverse infer-
218 See, e.g., United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir.
1986); United States v. Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.
1990).
219 See, e.g., A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 630.
220 Id.
221 A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 630. The Eleventh Circuit stated that Baldwin, a
suspected drug dealer, improperly attempted to take the privilege for the corporation
(Heidi) that owned the home, which was the subject of the forfeiture proceeding. Id. at
630. Citing Baxter, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court permissibly had drawn
an adverse inference from Baldwin's failure to respond to probative evidence, concluding
that his testimony would have been adverse to Heidi's claims. Id. Finally, the Eleventh
Circuit attempted to dispel any constitutional concerns by stating. "The Property was pro-
ceeds of Baldwin's illegal drug sales. Therefore, forfeiture of the Property was not an in-
stance of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of Section 881." Id. at 631.
222 United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1990).
223 United States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
993 (1980).
224 Id. at 18-19. The Sixth Circuit reasoned: forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal;
forfeiture penalties are closely related to criminal sanctions; and adverse inferences force
claimants to chose between two constitutional rights. Id.
225 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
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ence permissible in Baxter because Baxter was found guilty on the
basis of substantial evidence-the disciplinary board did not rely
solely on his silence to prove his guilt.
226
In contrast, forfeiture actions do not serve the same type of im-
portant state interests as those served in prison disciplinary hearings.
Unlike civil claimants, prisoners have limited constitutional rights.227
Prison official decisions are judged by a less restrictive test than that
applied to laws and regulations outside prison walls. 228 Moreover, the
state's burden of proof, substantial evidence, is interpreted in light of
the state's need to maintain order within the prison system.229 Finally,
the states' burden of proof in a prison disciplinary hearing, substantial
evidence, may be considerably higher than the government's burden
of proof in civil forfeiture, which, if unrebutted, may be met by prob-
able cause. Therefore, the Baxter test is arguably more lenient than
the test that should be applied to the rights of claimant's under 21
U.S.C. § 881.
Rylander is also distinguishable from civil forfeiture. In Rylander,
the defendant was charged with civil contempt.230 Civil contempt is
imposed for violating court orders. An individual may purge himself
of that contempt by complying with the court order.231 In contrast, in
civil forfeiture proceedings what is at stake is ownership of property-
once it is lost, the owner will not regain it.
232
226 Id. at 317-18.
227 In Price v.Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), the Court stated: "Lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights."
228 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990), (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)) (holding that "prison regulations alleged to infringe
constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordi-
narily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights").
229 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (holding that "[p]rison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply," but "there must be mutual accommoda-
tion between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that
are of general application").
230 United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761 (1983). Civil contempt sanctions are
imposed until an individual complies with a court order. Note that those who are charged
with criminal contempt receive full constitutional protections. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S.
624, 632 (1988).
231 Civil contempt sanctions are avoidable through obedience. The court may imposed
them after a civil proceeding, which requires neither ajury trial nor proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. See International Union United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552,
2557 (1994) (distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt). However, criminal con-
tempt may only be applied after a trial that includes full constitutional protections.
232 However, it is often difficult to distinguish between criminal and civil contempt sanc-
tions. The difficulty of distinguishing between the two of them, the "confusing mess of the
law," as well as the potential perception that the sanctions are arbitrary, has fueled criticism
from many commentators. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal
Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contemp 79 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1025
1996] 519
SHANNON T. NOYA
More importantly, as the Supreme Court held in Lefkowitz, citi-
zens cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves to serve govern-
mental needs.233 Claimants technically retain their constitutional
right in their property until they are shown to have used their prop-
erty in such a way as to break the law.234 By permitting an adverse
inference against the claimant, the Eleventh Circuit arguably circum-
vented a claimant's rights so the government could meet its goal of
undermining the economic base of narcotics traffickers.
235
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF FORFEITURE
A. CLAIMANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Recent Supreme Court holdings arguably indicate that claimants
should be awarded full Fifth Amendment protection in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Although the current line of cases have not directly ad-
dressed the Baxter-Rylander holdings, they 'seem to support the view
that Baxter-Rylander do not apply to narcotics forfeiture cases.
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,236 the govern-
ment seized a property owner's home and four acres of land four
years after he pled guilty to drug charges. 237 The district court
granted summary judgment to the government.238 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's holding, finding that the government had
violated the Due Process Clause through the seizure of Good's prop-
erty without prior notice and a hearing.239 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the Ninth Circuit,240  holding that absent "exigent
circumstances," due process requires the government to give notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to seizing real property.241
(1993).
233 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977).
234 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct 492, 501 (1993)
(depriving claimants of their property deprives them of the "valuable rights of owner-
ship"). See also United States v. Section 17 Township 23 North, 40 F.3d 320, 322 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1994) (finding that a stay did not come within the collateral order doctrine because
the claimant's property rights were being preserved through an occupancy agreement that
allowed them to stay on their property).
235 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
236 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
237 Good had been convicted of promoting a harmful drug, HAW. REv. STAT. § 712-
1245(1) (b) (date). The court sentenced him to one year in jail, five years probation, and
fined him $1,000. Id. at 497.
238 Id. at 498.
239 The Court of Appeals also found that the action had not been timely. Id. They
reasoned that limits are imposed on forfeiture actions by 19 U.S.C. §§ 1604-04; therefore,
the five year statute of limitations in 19 U.S.C. § 1621 creates only the "outer limit" for
filing forfeiture actions. Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 504.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy indicated the important
property rights that forfeiture provisions implicate: "Individual free-
dom finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in this and
many other forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the home
and those who take shelter within it."242 Depriving Good of his prop-
erty, even if only for a short time, deprived him of the "valuable rights
of ownership."243
The Court noted that the claimant's criminal conviction was irrel-
evant because "fair procedures are not confined to the innocent. 244
Reaffirming its earlier holdings, the Court stated that the applicability
of one constitutional right does not pre-empt the applicability of an-
other.2 5 The Court concluded that adversary hearings will ensure the
neutrality that should be characteristic of all governmental decision-
making,24 6 and courts must scrutinize governmental actions more
carefully whenever the State may benefit.247 Otherwise, ex parte
seizure will create a danger that the individual and society will per-
ceive governmental action as arbitrary and unfair.
2 48
James Daniel Good affirms the importance of an individual's prop-
erty rights. It reiterates the Boyd Court's concern with arbitrary gov-
ernment action.2 49 The holding arguably makes it more difficult for
the government to forfeit property through summary judgment. If
the government cannot rely on a claimant's conviction as part of its
case for summary judgment, and the court must carefully examine
state action whenever it is in a position to benefit, the state arguably
must make a stronger showing than that which is currently statutorily
demanded to justify summary judgment.
2 50
The Court recognized further constitutional protection to civil
242 Id. at 504.
243 Id. at 501.
244 Id. at 505.
245 Id. at 499 (quoting Sodal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992)).
246 Id. at 502.
247 Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (opinion ofJustice Scalia)).
248 Id. at 500 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)) (arguing that the pur-
pose of prior notice and a hearing is to "ensure abstract fair play to the individual" and to
"protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize
substantively unfair of mistaken deprivations of property.... ."). The Court noted that the
seizure in this case was different from the usual governmental search and seizure because
the Government seized property in order to assert ownership and control over it, not to
preserve evidence for future proceedings. Id.
249 Id. at 501.
250 Cf United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Located at 4560 Kingsbury Road,
Township of Brunswick Hills, No. 93-3-54, 1994 WL 28772, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1994)
(although a claimant's husband was convicted of running an illegal gambling business,
claimant's defense that she was an "innocent owner" without any other evidence, was suffi-
cient to defeat government's motion for sumimaryjudgement).
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forfeiture actions in Austin v. United States.2 51 In Austin the govern-
ment forfeited the mobile home and the bodyshop of the claimant,
Austin, after he sold a government informant two grams of cocaine. 252
The district court granted summary judgment for the United States
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
2 53
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that governments histor-
ically have perceived forfeiture as a punishment.2 54 Reserving the
question as to whether it violates due process to forfeit the possessions
of a truly innocent owner, the Court pointed out that the innocent
owner defense in the forfeiture statute implies some measure of guilt
in an owner.2 55 Additionally, the legislative history of 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) indicate that Congress intended the statute to
be punitive.2 5 6 Since the statute and the legislative history focus on
the culpability of the owner, the Court concluded that forfeiture
under § 881 serves as "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense."
257
The acknowledgement in Austin that forfeiture is punishment
closed the gap even further between forfeiture as a civil action and
forfeiture as a criminal sanction.2 58 Since the Austin Court found that
the guilt or innocence of an owner is now at issue in an action under
§ 881, there is no longer any substance to the "guilty" property fiction
within this statute.2 59 The excuse that Fifth Amendment rights are
not pertinent no longer applies. Courts must recognize that since the
guilt of a claimant is at issue, the Fifth Amendment right must not be
burdened.
251 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
252 Austin pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute and was sen-
tenced to seven years. Id. at 2803.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 2810.
255 Id. But see Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (finding that
when a state civil forfeiture statute is remedial, it does not violate due process to forfeit the
possessions of a truly innocent owner).
256 Austin, 113 U.S. at 2811 (quoting from S. REP. No. 98-225, 191 (1983) ("[T]he tradi-
tional criminal sanction of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the
enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs.").
257 Id. at 2812 (quoting Browning v. Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989)). In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 n.6 (1938), the Court stated
in a foomote that "Congress may not provide civil procedure for the enforcement of puni-
tive sanctions . ..."
258 See also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (finding that in civil cases
brought by the government the defendant should receive some of the same procedural
protections usually applied only in criminal cases).
259 However, the guilty property fiction is alive and well with regard to state remedial
civil forfeiture statutes. See Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996).
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B. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Courts have attempted to protect claimants from the harsh effects
of their testimony in civil forfeiture through stays, use immunity, and
protective orders.260 However, these solutions have not resolved the
problem. For the most part, these remedies have been unable to fully
protect the claimant against the possible adverse affects of her testi-
mony in the civil proceeding.
1. Stay
If the government has initiated criminal proceedings, it has a stat-
utory right to ask for a stay in the civil proceedings; the court may
grant one for "good cause shown."26' However, a claimant will have
trouble obtaining a stay if she has not established adequate stand-
ing;262 sometimes proving standing alone can implicate a claimant in
a crime. Moreover, a stay does not resolve the problem if the govern-
ment has not filed criminal proceedings.2 63 Since the government
may not have decided whether to pursue criminal charges, it is diffi-
cult for a civil court to determine the necessary length of time to stay
the proceedings.264 Finally, a stay will not be granted if a claimant
merely invokes her privilege against self-incrimination-she has to af-
260 United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that a district
court had discretionary power to determine how to accommodate a Fifth Amendment
interest).
261 The relevant provision reads:
The filing of an indictment of information alleging a violation of this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter, or a violation of State or local law that could have been
charged under this subchapter or subchapter II, which is also related to a civil forfei-
ture proceeding under this section shall, upon motion of the United States and for
good cause shown, stay the civil forfeiture proceeding.
21 U.S.C. § 881(i) (1989).
See also U.S. v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that courts may defer civil discovery
when in the interest of justice); United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1983)
(upholding the district court's denial of a stay pending an appeal of his criminal convic-
tion). In Little Al the court stated that stays are granted only for "special circumstances"
and the need to avoid "substantial and irreparable prejudice." Id. at 136 (quoting SEC v.
First Financial Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981)).
262 United States v. 526 Liscum Dr., 866 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[P]ossession of
bare legal title by one who does not exercise dominion or control over property may be
insufficient to establish standing to challenge a forfeiture.") (citing United States v. A Sin-
gle Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1945 Doug-
las C-54 (De-4) Aircraft, 604 F.2d 27, 28 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982)).
263 United States v. Premises Located at Highway 13/5 Phil Cambell, 747 F. Supp. 641,
651 (finding that the stay requested by the governmentwas unreasonable since two of the
claimants were "apparently" not going to be prosecuted).
264 In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1990) (criticizing the government for seiz-
ing property and then attempting to put "on hold" the civil forfeiture proceeding pending
the outcome of the civil case although the government had not demonstrated that "no
substantial harm" would be suffered by the claimant).
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firmatively prove why she cannot use other testimony to substantiate
her defense.2 65
If there is a pending criminal charge, acquittal of that charge will
not have collateral estoppel effect,266 whereas conviction will.267 Ac-
quittal also will not protect the claimant from a subsequent forfeiture
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 68 And, after an acquittal,
through discovery in the civil forfeiture proceedings, the government
may obtain information regarding crimes for which the claimant has
not been charged. 269 For example, it may discover information about
other narcotics proceeds.270 Therefore, a stay in the civil proceeding
arguably may not offer a claimant adequate protection.
2. Use Immunity
Frequently, a claimant will ask for use immunity for any testimo-
nial information she gives during a civil forfeiture proceeding.2 71 Use
immunity protects a claimant from the use of any incriminating infor-
mation revealed by her testimony during the civil proceeding.2 72
However, only the executive branch has the authority to grant use im-
munity.2 73 In federal court, the United States Attorney must request
use immunity before it will be granted.274 Use immunity has not been
automatically applied in civil forfeiture cases because courts have
found that it does not meet the test established by Simmons v. United
States.275
In Simmons, the Court held that use immunity must be granted
265 United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, 23 F.3d 359, 364 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that a
court may deny a stay as long as the privilege's invocation does not compel an adverse
judgement).
266 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234 (1972) (finding that
a civil proceeding does not require a showing of intent).
267 United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908,
917-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990).
268 See id. at 916; United States v. Price, 914 U.S. 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
269 See Christine Meyer, Zero Tolerancefor Forfeiture: A Call for Reform of Civil Forfeiture Law,
5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 853 (1991).
270 See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968) (holding "a defendant's
testimony at a former trial is admissible against him at a later trial"); United States v. Little
Al, 712 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1983); see also FED. R. EviD. 801 (d) (2) (A) (party admissions are
not hearsay). However, discovery may cut both ways. The government may request a stay
in the proceedings so as to avoid civil discovery that might hamper their criminal case. See,
e.g., United States v. Section 17 Township, 23 North, 40 F.3d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1994).
271 See, e.g., United States v. All Assets and Equipment of West Side Building Corp., 843
F. Supp. 377, 383 (N.D. Il. 1994).
272 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
273 In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1475 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1240 (1988).
274 Id.
275 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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when a claimant gives up one constitutional right at the expense of
another. 276 Courts have viewed civil forfeiture proceedings as burden-
ing the Fifth Amendment right but not eliminating it.277 More impor-
tantly, because of the Supreme Court's statement in Simmons that
"testimony given for his own benefit by a plaintiff in a civil suit is ad-
missible against him in a subsequent criminal prosection,"278 courts
have interpreted Simmons to limit a claimant's right. Claimants are
not often successful in their attempt to obtain use immunity. The gov-
ernment is reluctant to grant it because it can significantly cripple any
subsequent prosecution of the claimant.279
3. Protective Orders
Claimants will also attempt to shield themselves against further
charges by requesting a protective order.2 80 Protective orders seal the
court records and forbid disclosure of any discovery or testimony in
the forfeiture proceedings to anyone not designated in the order.281
But protective orders tend to be ineffective.28 2 They are subject to
modification, and courts are unpredictable in their decisions regard-
ing modification.
28 3
276 Simmons held that use immunity is constitutionally required when a proceeding
places a defendant in a position of choosing one constitutional right over another. Id. But
see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1987) (holding that the Constitution limits "the
imposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the Fifth Amendment 'costly'").
277 United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 629-30 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that courts may take a negative inference from a claimant's silence as long as the
final judgement is not based solely on the negative inference).
278 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 n.23.
279 If the government grants use immunity, then in subsequent proceedings it must
meet the test established in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). This test re-
quires the government to show that it did not obtain evidence in the criminal trial through
the immunized testimony. Id.
280 United States v. Korbel, 397 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (stating that the appropriate remedy for
concurrent proceedings is a protective order postponing civil discovery until the resolution
of the criminal action).
281 Id.
282 Protective orders are ineffective against a grand jury subpoena. See In re GrandJury
Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (4th Cir. 1988) (The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a civil
protective order could not shield deponents from grand jury subpoenas since they were
entitled only to a grant of use immunity or their Fifth Amendment right to silence. A
protective order would "usurp the authority of the executive branch to balance the public's
interest in confidentiality against their interest in effective criminal investigation."). Addi-
tionally, a protective order does not prevent a claimant's statements from being used in
anotherjurisdiction. See United States v. Parcels of Land, 908 F.2d 86, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1990)
(responding to a claimant's fear that his statements would lead to criminal prosecution in
New Hampshire, the First Circuit held that "[t]he court's protective order was a reasonable
effort to address fifth amendment concerns and more than satisfied the requirements of
the accommodation principle.").
283 See, e.g., United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Recently, the Sixth Circuit rejected stays, use immunity, and pro-
tective orders as adequate means of safeguarding a claimant's lights in
civil forfeiture proceedings. The Sixth Circuit made a compelling ar-
gument that the close alignment between civil forfeiture and criminal




Claimants' constitutional rights can only be protected by merging
civil forfeiture actions into the parallel criminal action.285 Current
civil forfeiture statutes give the government unfair advantage286 by
granting it the lower burden of proof and allowing it, through the use
of adverse inferences, to collect evidence from the claimant herself.
28 7
Arguably, claimants have been compelled to choose between their lib-
erty and their property.
28 8
Allowing the government to seize property only under criminal
forfeiture statutes would protect a claimant's constitutional rights.
The government would proceed in personam and prove the property
forfeitable beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then could the govern-
284 United States v. Real Property Known and Numbered as Rural Route 1, 24 F.3d 845,
851 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that in light of Austin's finding that civil forfeiture is "closely
related" to a criminal sanction, the court cannot regard these proceedings as "traditional
civil proceedings"); see also United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980). But see United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency,
808 F.2d 895, 901 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that courts should not dismiss forfeiture even if
it prejudices claimant's Fifth Amendment rights).
285 Several commentators have suggested that the legislature either merge the two pro-
cedures or grant the civil procedures the same constitutional safeguards as the criminal
procedure. See Schecter, supra note 3, at 1182-83 (suggesting that the government be re-
quired to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt or "at a mini-
mum" prove that the owner had scienter and that their property is connected to illegal
drugs); Leach & Malcolm, supra note, 1, at 285-91 (proposing a revision of the criminal
forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982, which would eliminate civil forfeiture proceedings). See
generally Ann L. IiJima, The War on Drugs: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Falls Victim to
State Taxation of Controlled Substances, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 101, 104 (arguing that the
government either should use the criminal justice system to pursue the objectives of deter-
rence and retribution or grant defendants "the full spectrum of constitutional guarantees,
including the privilege against self-incrimination"). But see Durkin, supra note 3, at 705
(suggesting that to resolve the Fifth Amendment dilemma, the government should have
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence).
286 See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 242-43; Finklestein, supra note 28, at 182; Piety,
supra note 31, at 927-42.
287 See Mann, supra note 56, at 1871-73 (suggesting that the "existing framework of puni-
tive civil monetary sanctions must be criticized not- only for the inadequate procedural
protections it provides for defendants, but also for the inadequate severity of the sanctions
allowed").
288 But see United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 16 n.5 (2d Cir.
1982) (stating in a jury instruction that forfeitures laws do not "expressly" compel claim-
ants to testify).
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ment convict the defendant and return a special verdict against the
property. Most important, the court would afford the claimant all the
constitutional protections of a criminal defendant, including an un-
burdened right to silence.
A single proceeding would be consistent with recent Supreme
Court holdings.289 Now that the Court has recognized that civil forfei-
ture actions under the Drug Abuse and Prevention Act are punitive
and meant to have a deterrent effect,29 0 the judicial system can no
longer submerge a claimant's "guilt or innocence" within the fiction
of the in rem action. If a claimant's guilt or innocence is being judged
in a civil proceeding, it is redundant to require separate civil and crim-
inal proceedings. Moreover, such a requirement arguably violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause
2 91
Merging the two actions also will take some of the burden off the
overloaded court system. 29 2 Two proceedings, civil and criminal, usu-
ally require two lawyers, two courtrooms, and two judges. The dual
proceedings waste time and resources.293 And the civil proceeding
often requires many expensive procedural devices like depositions, in-
terrogatories, motions, and pretrial orders.2 94 If forfeitures are lim-
ited to criminal proceedings, the claimant will have a higher incentive
to plea bargain, and the judge might be more amenable to listen to a
request for leniency.2 95 Finally, mandating use of the criminal system
for forfeiture may make it more difficult for claimants to circumvent
the system by transferring property to relatives2 96 who can claim that
they are "innocent owners"2 97 or by claiming protection for civil forfei-
289 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that some of the proce-
dural protections granted to criminal defendants should apply in civil cases brought by the
government when the purpose of the proceeding is to punish the defendant); Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (finding that under some circumstances forfei-
ture is punishment).
290 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
291 See supra note 9 and infra note 298 and accompanying text.
292 See United States of America v. Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-
07143, 971 F.2d 974, 981 (3rd Cir. 1972) (stating that "the backlog of civil forfeiture cases
in some parts of the country has become unmanageable" and suggesting that federal pros-
ecutors pursue criminal, rather than civil forfeitures in drug cases).
293 See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 244-45.
294 See id. at 266.
295 Id. at 266-77.
296 See id. at 267-68 (discussing Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir.
1992)). In Onwubiko, a defendant plea bargained a narcotics charge then disputed the civil
forfeiture action on the grounds that the cash that was seized was not proceeds. Id.
297 Id. at 268-69 (discussing United States v. A Parcel of Land Known as 92 Buena Vista
Ave, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1128 (1993)) Leach & Malcolm argue that if Buena Vista had pro-
ceeded under a criminal forfeiture statute, the innocent owner provision would not have
applied and 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988) would have governed. It protects only a transferee
who is a "bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
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ture under the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 98
VII. CONCLUSION
The history of the Fifth Amendment indicates that it arose as a
means of preventing the government from abusing its power by ex-
tracting incriminating statements from individuals.2 99 Current civil
forfeiture proceedings are uncomfortably like the English ecclesiasti-
cal proceedings that produced the Fifth Amendment: the govern-
ment's complaint may establish prima facie proof of its case; the
higher burden of proof is on the defendant; and silence is taken as a
confession through adverse inferences.300 Most importantly, until re-
cently, the lack of constitutional protections for a claimant's rights
may have given the impression that the government acted
arbitrarily.30'
As commentators have pointed out, our society was founded on
protection of individual rights; yet civil forfeiture proceedings tend to
subordinate the individual to the common good.302 Undoubtedly
there is something satisfying about funding our law enforcement ef-
forts with forfeiture proceeds; in effect, hoisting the drug trafficker
with her own petard.303 But we cannot fight the drug problem in the
United States at the expense of an individual's constitutional rights.
Merging criminal and civil forfeiture statutes would fulfill the
needs of our society by depriving a narcotics dealer of her illegally
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section." Id.
298 See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 270-71 (discussing United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper, the Court found that punitive civil sanctions as opposed to
remedial sanctions violate the DoubleJeopardy Clause when a defendant has undergone a
criminal prosecution for the same underlying act. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49. See also
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (holding that in some circumstances
civil forfeiture actions are punitive).
299 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (quoting Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) that "the privilege against self-incrimination 'was aimed at a...
far-reaching evil-a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in
their stark brutality'").
300 See supra section II.B.
301 See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 254 (contending that the government uses the
civil penalty to "exact an economic sanction against individuals who are either beyond the
reach of the criminaIjustice system or against whom there is simply insufficient evidence to
convict them of a crime."); DavidJ. Fried, Criminal Law: Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79
J. C~am. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 331 (1988). Fried argues: "Civil forfeiture is a farrango of
injustice sanctified by tradition. Its historical justifications, such as they are, have been left
behind by its alarming extension in recent years, and its adoption as a criminal punish-
ment, when its viability has always depended on its status as a civil penalty, is unprincipled."
Id.
302 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
303 See supra note 1.
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acquired money and property but not at the expense of her constitu-
tional rights. The procedure would be more just because a claimant
could claim the protections of the Fifth Amendment withoutjeopard-
izing her property rights. The single action would eliminate any socie-
tal perception that civil forfeiture proceedings are arbitrary and
unfair.
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